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A Symposium on the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court
National Security Panel
THE REHNQUIST COURT’S NONINTERFERENCE WITH THE
GUARDIANS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Gregory E. Maggs*
Introduction
The “Rehnquist Court” came into existence in September 1986 when
President Ronald Reagan and the Senate elevated William H. Rehnquist
from his position as an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to
Chief Justice of the United States. The era of the Rehnquist Court came to
a close in September 2005 with the sad news of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
death.
In this nineteen-year period, the Supreme Court decided many important
national security cases. The term “national security” generally refers to the
safety of the U.S. government, territory, and people from external threats.1
When the Rehnquist Court initially began, the Cold War had not ended, and
the United States was mostly concerned with risks posed by the communist
Soviet Union.2 But at least since 2001, the nation has given most of its

*

Professor of Law, The Geo rge Washington University Law School. I presented
this Essay during the National Security Panel of the Symposium on the Legacy of
the Rehnquist Court that The George Washington Law Review hosted on October
28-29, 200 5. I wo uld like to thank the moderator, the Honorable Steven Colloton,
and other panelists, Professors Burt Neuborne, Jona than T urley, and John Yoo, for
their comments.
1
Federal regulations contain various similar definitions of “national security.”
See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 171.20(i) (2005) (“National Security means the national
defense or foreign relations of the U nited S tates.”); 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c)(9) (2005)
(“Protection of the national security means to protect the United States from any of
the following actual or potential threats to its security by a foreign power or its
agents: (i) An attack or other grave, hostile act; (ii) Sabotage, or international
terrorism; or (iii) Clande stine intelligence activities, includ ing commercial
espio nage.”).
2
See A my B . Zegart, Septemb er 11 and the Ad aptatio n Failure of U .S.
Intelligence Agencies, 29 Int’l Security 78, 79 (2005) (describing how, for more
than forty years, the CIA and thirteen other U.S. intelligence agencies perceived the
Soviet Union as the princ ipal threat to U .S. national security).
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attention to threats from international terrorism and to the possibility that
weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of rogue nations.3
The Supreme Court does not decide in the first instance what to do
about national security. The Rehnquist Court, for example, never had to
determine whether the United States was following the right strategy in the
Cold War, how to respond to North Korea’s nuclear program, or what
measures to take against international terrorism. On the contrary, what is
most commonly litigated in the Supreme Court is usually one or more steps
removed*1123 from these inherently political, diplomatic, and strategic
questions. As this Essay will show, the Supreme Court usually is limited to
reviewing the legality of governmental actions taken either in preparation
for national security threats or in response to them. For example, the Court
has had to decide whether the military may detain terrorists,4 whether the
Department of Transportation may require drug testing for customs
officials,5 whether the decision of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency to dismiss certain employees who might pose security risks is
judicially reviewable,6 and whether the states (as opposed to the federal
government) may enact legislation to influence foreign policy. 7
This Essay describes numerous important national security cases that
the Supreme Court decided between 1986 and 2005. Giving attention to
these national security cases at this time is fitting because the United States
is now engaged in armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and is fighting
terrorism both at home and in other places around the world. In addition,
Chief Justice Rehnquist had a special interest in the Supreme Court’s role
in national security matters: in 1998, he wrote a comprehensive book called
All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime.8 In this work, he
discussed the tensions between national security and individual rights

3

See B ureau of Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Iran, North Korea
Threaten to Develop, Sp read N uclear W eapons: Nuclear Proliferation Seco nd O nly
to Terrorism as D anger to U nited S tates, W ash. File, Mar. 1, 2006 , http://
usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006& m=M arch
&x= 200 603 011 739 19id ybeekcm0.1129419 [hereinafter State Department
Inform ation R elease].
4
See H amd i v. Rum sfeld, 542 U .S. 507, 50 9 (2004 ).
5
See Nat’l Treasury Employees U nion v. Von Raab, 48 9 U.S. 656, 65 9 (1989 ).
6
See W ebster v. Do e, 486 U .S. 59 2, 59 8-99 (1988).
7
See C rosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 53 0 U .S. 36 3, 36 6 (2000 ).
8
W illiam H . Rehnq uist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime
(1998).
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during times of war.9 Although the book dealt almost exclusively with
cases decided before 1986, as this Essay will show, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s observations and analysis remain relevant today.
Based on an examination of the Rehnquist Court’s national security
cases, this Essay makes three claims. The first claim is that the Rehnquist
Court generally did not interfere with the governmental units that serve as
the guardians of national security. These guardians include the President
and various federal departments and agencies such as the Department of
Defense (“DOD”), the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and others. The Rehnquist Court almost
always rejected challenges to governmental actions taken by these
guardians of national security when the guardians justified the actions
based on the need to protect the United States from external threats.
The second claim is that the Rehnquist Court’s hands-off approach
generally had favorable consequences. It promoted national security by
leaving the subject to the governmental units most competent to address the
topic. The Rehnquist Court’s practice of noninterference also kept the
Court out of the kinds of controversies that in other areas of the law have
embroiled the Court in political disputes that have damaged its reputation.10
Although the *1124 national security policies of the United States have
many critics, few of these critics fault the Supreme Court for the content of
these policies; instead, they sensibly assign responsibility for the policies
to the political branches that created them.11 Fortunately, the institutional
benefits to the Supreme Court from its practice of noninterference came at
little cost. Although a deferential approach in national security cases might
have led to significant governmental abuses, that potential consequence
does not appear to have occurred during the past nineteen years.
The third claim is that the Rehnquist Court’s principal legacy to the
Roberts Court is one of experience. The Rehnquist Court did not establish
a generalized and binding doctrine of noninterference that the Roberts
Court must follow. Instead, in case after case, the Rehnquist Court simply
found some way to defer to or otherwise uphold governmental choices.
Although the Roberts Court now has considerable freedom to choose

9

See id .
See infra Part II.A.2. (discussing how noninterference in areas of national
security may have kep t the Court out of the kinds of controversies created by the
Court’s extensive invo lveme nt in pub lic safety issues like criminal procedure, the
death penalty, and prisoners’ rights).
11
See infra Pa rt II.A.2.
10
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another approach, it has the benefit of knowing that the Rehnquist Court’s
practice served both the Court and the nation very well.
I. Guardians of National Security and How They Fared
The United States has many guardians of national security--agencies and
other political entities that have the responsibility of keeping the country
safe. These guardians include federal law enforcement agencies, the armed
forces, the intelligence services, and other governmental units. A useful
way to appreciate the breadth and consistency of the Rehnquist Court’s
practice in national security matters is to look at how the Court treated
these various guardians. The Court’s cases reveal that, regardless of the
governmental agency or legal issue involved, the Rehnquist Court almost
always upheld actions taken in the name of national security. Or to put it
another way, the Rehnquist Court generally followed a practice of
noninterference in national security matters.
A. The FBI
The FBI has domestic counterterrorism and counterespionage responsibilities and has often become involved in national security programs. One
significant Rehnquist Court decision concerning the actions of the FBI was
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,12 decided in 1989. In that case, the
FBI was investigating potential fraud by a defense contractor in a secret
military program.13 In an apparent attempt to discover what the investigators knew and did not know, the contractor requested documents from the
FBI under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).14 But the FBI
refused to turn over the documents, citing an exception that allowed it to
keep records compiled for law enforcement purposes, including those
involving national security investigations.15 In an opinion by Justice
Blackmun (joined by five others, *1125 including Chief Justice Rehnquist),

12

John Do e Agency v. John D oe C orp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989).
See id . at 148 -49 & 148 n.1.
14
Id. at 149; see also F reedom o f Inform ation A ct, 5 U .S.C. § 552 (2000).
15
See J ohn D oe A gency, 493 U.S. at 149-50; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(“This section does not apply to matters that are--...(7) records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production
of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected
to interfere with enforcement proceedings...[or] (D) could reasonably be expected
to disclose...in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information
furnished by a confid ential source....”).
13
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the Supreme Court held that the FBI could retain the requested records,
even though the government had not originally compiled the records for
law enforcement purposes.16
The John Doe case has significance because the holding may permit the
FBI and other governmental agencies to use the “compiled for” exception
in FOIA to make otherwise nonsecret information unobtainable on grounds
of national security. For example, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
United States sought to use immigration laws to thwart further terrorist
actions.17 The federal government detained hundreds of aliens, mostly from
the Middle East, for minor immigration violations.18 Few if any of these
aliens actually had ties to terrorism.19 And in other circumstances, the
government probably would not have arrested them. 20 A factor making the
program especially controversial was that the government refused to make
a list of the detainees’ names known to the public, fearing that such a list
might reveal to terrorist organizations which of their members the
government had arrested and which it had not.21
In Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of
Justice,22 a private organization challenged this nondisclosure policy. 23 It
made a FOIA request asking for the names of the persons detained on
immigration charges.24 The government, invoking the “compiled for law
enforcement” exception, argued that it did not have to release the names.25
The D.C. Circuit upheld the government’s position, concluding that John
Doe Agency and other decisions permitted the government to withhold the

16

See J ohn D oe A gency, 493 U.S. at 147 , 155 .
See Gregory E. M aggs, Terrorism and the Law: Cases and Materials 124
(2005).
18
Id. at 127-2 8.
19
Id. at 125-2 6.
20
Id. at 125.
21
Official expressions of the government’s policy and its rationale app ear in
declarations by James S. Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism and V iolent Crime
Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, and Dale L. W atson, the FBI’s Executive
Assistant Director for C ounterterrorism. These declarations are quoted in Brief for
the Resp ond ent in O ppo sition at 6-7, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec urity Studies v. Dep’t of
Justice, 540 U.S. 110 4 (2005 ) (No . 03-4 72), availab le at 20 03 W L 22 989 100 .
22
Ctr. for Nat’l Security Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.
200 3).
23
Id. at 920.
24
Id. at 920-2 1.
25
Id.
17
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names.26 Even though the individual names by themselves were not secret,
the collection of the names fit within the FOIA’s “compiled for law
enforcement” exception.27
*1126 B. Drug Enforcement Administration
For many years, the United States has waged an international campaign
against illegal drugs. Another guardian of national security, and one
engaged in this campaign, is the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”). In 1990, the Rehnquist Court decided an important case related
to the DEA and the war on drugs called United States v. VerdugoUrquidez.28 In that case, DEA agents assisted Mexican authorities in
searching the Mexican home of Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican
citizen suspected of illegal narcotics activities.29 When the U.S. government later tried Verdugo-Urquidez in federal court in California, VerdugoUrquidez objected to the introduction of evidence obtained from his
home.30 He asserted that the search had violated the Fourth Amendment
because the DEA had not obtained a warrant.31
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
rejected Verdugo-Urquidez’s argument.32 It held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search of an alien’s residence outside the United
States.33 The Court explained:
The available historical data show . . . that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against
arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested
that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal
Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.34

26

Id. at 925-2 6.
Id. at 926 (“Plaintiffs are seeking a co mprehensive listing of individuals
detained during the post-September 11 investigation. The names have been
compiled for the ‘law enforcement purpo se’ of successfully prosecuting the
terrorism investigation. As compiled, they constitute a comprehensive diagram of
the law enfo rcem ent investigation after September 11. Clearly this is information
com piled for law enforcement purp oses.” (quo ting 5 U .S.C. § 552 (b)(7 )(A))).
28
United States v. Verdugo-U rquid ez, 49 4 U .S. 25 9 (1990 ).
29
Id. at 262.
30
Id. at 263.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 261, 2 74-7 5.
33
Id. at 274-7 5.
34
Id. at 266.
27
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The Court therefore concluded that the United States could introduce
evidence obtained from the Mexican home in its prosecution.35
The Verdugo-Urquidez decision has far-reaching national security
implications. If the Rehnquist Court had reached a different conclusion, the
Fourth Amendment might limit the ability of the federal government to
practice espionage against our foreign enemies. But the CIA, National
Security Agency (“NSA”), and military intelligence agencies presumably
conduct searches and wiretaps in foreign countries without obtaining a
warrant.36 Although*1127 these agencies generally do not seek to use the
information that they collect as evidence in court, they still could face
liability or other sanctions for violating the Fourth Amendment if the Court
had held that the Amendment’s prohibitions apply outside of the United
States.37
The Verdugo-Urquidez decision also is playing a key role in litigation
arising out of the United States’ War on Terror. The federal courts, for
example, have relied on the precedent in two cases stemming from al
Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. One
decision, styled United States v. Bin Laden 38 in reference to the mastermind of the conspiracy, concerned the indictment of some of the suspects
in the bombing. Agents of the United States had questioned these suspects
in Africa.39 The trial court had to determine, on the basis of the Verdugo-

35
36

See id . at 274 -75.
The Co urt exp lained:

The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals would apply not only to law
enforcement operations abro ad, but also to other fo reign policy operations which
might result in ‘searches or seizures.’ T he U nited S tates freq uently employs Armed
Forces outside this country...for the protection of American citizens or national
security.... Application of the F ourth Amendment to those circum stances could
significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign
situations involving our national interest. W ere respondent to prevail, aliens with
no attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedy
claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international
waters.
Id. at 273-7 4.
37
See id .
38
United States v. Bin Lad en, 13 2 F. Supp . 2d 1 68 (S.D.N.Y . 200 1).
39
Id. at 171-7 2.
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Urquidez decision, the extent to which the suspects were entitled to the
benefits of the Miranda rule regarding confessions.40
The other decision, El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United
States,41 concerned the consequences of a military action that the United
States took following the bombings of U.S. embassies abroad. To strike
back at al Qaeda, the United States fired missiles at a pharmaceutical plant
in Sudan that it believed was making chemical weapons for bin Laden.42
The owner of the plant, who denied any link to al Qaeda, subsequently sued
the U.S. government for the taking of his property.43 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to determine, among other
issues, whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez barred
claims for compensation for property taken outside of the United States.44
In addition, the Verdugo-Urquidez decision has come up in lower court
litigation concerning detainees whom the United States captured when
fighting in Afghanistan and now holds at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The decisions in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases45
and Khalid v. Bush46 disagreed about whether detainees at Guantanamo
have a right to *1128 due process under the Fifth Amendment.47 Because
of this division, more litigation on this subject appears likely.
C. CIA, NSA, and Other Intelligence Agencies
The CIA and the NSA also have responsibility for protecting the nation
from external threats. These agencies collectively had several cases before
the Supreme Court. Much like the situation for other government entities,

40

See id . at 181 -82 (c omp aring the extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendm ent and Fourth Amendm ent based on the reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez);
see also Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41
El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
42
See id . at 134 9.
43
Id. at 1348 -49.
44
Id. at 1352 (concluding that the “takings claim at bottom presents a
nonjusticiable political questio n,” rendering it unnec essary to determine whether the
Verdugo-Urquid ez de cision also blo cked the claim ).
45
In re G uantan amo Detainee C ases, 355 F . Supp. 2d 443 (D.D .C. 20 05).
46
Kha lid v. B ush, 35 5 F. Supp . 2d 3 11 (D.D .C. 20 05).
47
Compare Guantanamo, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 463-64 (distinguishing VerdugoUrquidez and holding that the detainees have a right to due p rocess under the Fifth
Amendment), with Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (relying on VerdugoUrquidez, among other decisions, in holding that nonresident aliens captured and
detained outside the United S tates do not have co nstitutional rights).
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when these agencies defended their actions based on national security, the
Rehnquist Court generally did not interfere.
In Webster v. Doe,48 the CIA discharged an employee because it
determined that his homosexuality posed a security risk. 49 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,50 concluded that the
employee had no administrative remedies under any statute.51 The Court
remanded the case for consideration of the employee’s constitutional
claim.52 Following remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
considered the constitutional question.53 The court concluded that the
CIA’s action did not violate the guarantee of equal protection because
terminating the employee was “rationally related to the legitimate
government security interest in collecting foreign intelligence and
protecting the nation’s secrets.” 54 The Supreme Court denied the employee’s petition for review.55 In the same year, the Rehnquist Court
similarly rejected administrative challenges to adverse personnel actions
taken by NSA and the Department of the Navy against employees whom
these agencies deemed to present security risks.56

48

W ebster v. Do e, 486 U .S. 59 2 (1988 ).
Id. at 595.
50
This Essay is about the legac y of the Re hnqu ist Court in national security
cases generally, not just about the legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist himself. The
broader focus is appropriate because the Chief Justice has only one vote, the same
as each of the Associate Justices, and thus cannot by himself or herself set the
Court’s jurisprudential path. Yet, the Chief Justice does have a special po wer worth
noting. W hen in the majority, the C hief Justice can decid e to write the ma jority
opinion himself or herself or instead decide to assign the opinion to so meone else
in the majority who ma y have very closely aligned views. W hat the m ajority
opinion says (or does not say) may influence subsequent decisions. See Barry
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 291-92 (2005)
(“[T]he Chief Justice assigns the opin ion if he is in the majority; otherwise the
senior associate Justice assigns. Empirical work suggests that the initial opinion
assignee often ends up writing the opinion for the Court and that most members of
the majority coalition join without requesting any changes, making the initial
assignm ent incre dibly important as to the direction the law will take.”).
51
W ebster, 486 U.S. at 594 , 601 .
52
Id. at 604-0 5.
53
Do e v. Gates, 98 1 F.2 d 13 16, 1 324 (D.C . Cir. 19 93).
54
Id. (quotatio n omitted).
55
Do e v. W oolse y, 510 U.S. 928 (1993).
56
See Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 95 (198 8) (considering a challenge to the
discharge of an NSA employee who admitted having homosexual relationship s with
foreign nationals); Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526-27 (1988)
49

10
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*1129 A more recent case, Christopher v. Harbury,57 was about denying
a concerned citizen access to classified information. That case involved
Jennifer Harbury, the American widow of a Guatemalan dissident who died
in custody of the Guatemalan Army.58 She sued the CIA, State Department,
and National Security Council, and officials of each agency, alleging that
they had withheld information about her husband and thus prevented her
from bringing a lawsuit to save him. 59
The Supreme Court denied relief.60 It held that Harbury failed to state
a claim of denial of access to the courts because she had not identified what
cause of action she might have brought.61 The Court also emphasized that
further judicial inquiry would raise concerns for the separation of powers
because it would encroach on diplomatic matters committed to other
branches.62 The Court thus did not interfere with the intelligence agencies’
withholding of the information.
Another recent decision, Tenet v. Doe,63 concerned the rights of
informants for the CIA. Two foreign nationals sued the Director of the CIA,
claiming that he had broken a promise to provide them with financial
support in exchange for their espionage work. 64 The Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that public policy barred
the courts from hearing suits against the government based on covert
espionage agreements.65 The CIA thus was free to not keep any promises
of support that it might have made.
In each of these cases, the Court declined to interfere with actions taken
by federal intelligence agencies in the name of national security. How
important are these cases? An observer might be tempted to dismiss them
as not very significant from a national security law perspective. If the
government had lost each of these cases, the nation probably would not
have faced much increased peril. The apparent dangers simply were not that
great.
(holding that the M erit Systems Protection Board could not review the revocation
of a civilian emp loyee’s se curity clea rance ).
57
Christo pher v. Ha rbury, 5 36 U .S. 40 3 (2002 ).
58
See id . at 406 .
59
See id . at 408 .
60
Id. at 415.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 417.
63
Tenet v. D oe, 544 U .S. 1 (2 005 ).
64
See id . at 4.
65
Id. at 8.
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But that is not the correct conclusion to draw. These cases clearly were
important to the parties and to all persons similarly situated. The loss of a
job to a typical government employee, information about a missing spouse,
or payment for potentially dangerous spying are no small matters to the
individuals concerned. Yet the Rehnquist Court still chose not to interfere,
even when contrary decisions would have posed little danger to the country.
These cases thus strongly illustrate the Court’s preference for not interfering with the guardians of national security.
*1130 D. Customs Service
The Customs Service also plays a role in protecting the United States
from external threats to its security. A large part of its mission is to prevent
illegal items from coming across the borders.66 In the course of its work,
the Customs Service prevents or fails to prevent weapons or other
dangerous materials from reaching the hands of terrorists or other enemies
who might harm America.
The Rehnquist Court did not interfere with the Customs Service’s
actions in a major case in which the Customs Service justified the actions
on the grounds of national security. In National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab,67 the Court allowed the Customs Service to perform
suspicionless drug tests on employees applying for promotion to positions
involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring the carrying of firearms.
The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily prohibits the
government from making searches (including searches for drugs through
drug testing) unless the government has some reason to believe that the
search will yield evidence of wrongdoing.68 But the Court concluded that
the drug testing by the Customs Service did not violate the Fourth
Amendment due to “the extraordinary safety and national security hazards
that would attend the promotion of drug users.”69
The Von Raab decision is now playing an important role in litigation
regarding counterterrorism measures. For example, following the bombing
attacks on London subways in 2005, New York City instituted a practice

66

See U .S. Customs and B order Prot., U.S. Customs Service--Over 200 Years
of History, http://www.cbp.go v/xp/cgov/too lbox/abo ut/history/history.xml (last
visited June 11 , 2006 ) (describing the mission of the Customs Service, which
prominen tly includes “[i]nterd icting and seizing contraband”).
67
Nat’l Trea sury Emplo yees U nion v. Von Raab, 489 U .S. 65 6 (1989 ).
68
See id . at 665 .
69
Id. at 674.
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of searching containers brought into its subway system. 70 In an opinion
citing Von Raab eight times, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to this
program. 71 The court found the practice to be “a reasonable method of
deterring (and detecting) a terrorist bombing of the New York City subway
system,” and compared it favorably to the Customs Service’s drug testing
program upheld by the Rehnquist Court.72
E. State Department
The State Department is another guardian of national security, managing
international relations as a method of protecting the United States. As with
other departments and agencies in the federal government, the Rehnquist
Court did not interfere with the State Department when it justified its
actions on grounds of national security. In American Foreign Service Ass’n
v. *1131 Garfinkel,73 for example, foreign service officers sued to enjoin
the State Department from requiring them to sign nondisclosure agreements.74 While the litigation was pending in the lower courts, Congress
passed a law supporting the foreign service officers.75 The United States
argued to the Supreme Court that the statute unconstitutionally intruded
upon executive power “to regulate the disclosure of national security
information.”76 Because of the importance of the constitutional question
posed by the new act, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against the
State Department and remanded the case.77 On remand, the district court
interpreted the statute in a way that favored the State Department and
avoided any constitutional issue.78 The federal courts thus did not interfere
with the State Department’s use of the form.
The Garfinkel decision has affected national security in other areas. For
example, in Encuentro Del Canto Popular v. Christopher,79 a group of
70

See MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM , 2005 WL 3338573
(S.D .N.Y . Dec . 7, 20 05).
71
Id. at *1.
72
Id. at *18.
73
Am. Fore ign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 49 0 U .S. 15 3 (1989 ).
74
Id. at 155.
75
Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 630, 101
Stat. 13 29, 1 432 (1987).
76
Garkfinkel, 4 90 U .S. at 15 8.
77
Id. at 161.
78
Am. Fore ign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 73 2 F. Supp . 13, 1 6 (D .D.C . 199 0).
79
Encuentro Del Canto Popular v. Christopher, 930 F. Sup p. 13 60 (N.D . Cal.
199 6).
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Cuban musicians sought entry into the United States. The State Department
denied them visas.80 It based its decision on a presidential proclamation
requiring exclusion of “’individuals who, notwithstanding the type of
passport that they hold, are considered by the Secretary of State or his
designee to be officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the
Communist Party of Cuba.”’ 81 The sponsors of the musicians argued that
a federal statute had overturned the proclamation.82 Following Garfinkel,
however, the district court rejected this argument, interpreting the federal
statute in favor of the State Department’s position so as to avoid the
“thorny constitutional question whether or to what extent the President’s
power over foreign affairs must yield to Congress’ power over immigration
in cases in which both areas are implicated.”83 The State Department thus
again prevailed.
F. Federal Government vs. the States
The Rehnquist Court’s national security cases did not all involve
disputes between the executive branch and private parties. In Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council,84 the Court considered the respective
roles of the federal government and the states. The case arose after
Massachusetts enacted a law designed to put pressure on the repressive
government of Burma.85 The law restricted the ability of state agencies to
purchase goods or *1132 services from companies that did business with
Burma.86 But the Rehnquist Court found the state law preempted by a
federal statute, which among other things had sought to give the President
“effective discretion . . . to control economic sanctions against Burma.”87
The Court thus made clear that the federal government, rather than the
states, is the keeper of national security.
The Rehnquist Court also adhered to this approach in a case concerning
the National Guard. In Perpich v. Department of Defense,88 the Minnesota
governor opposed the federal government’s decision to send the Minnesota
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Id. at 1362 .
Id. (quoting Proclamation No. 537 7, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,32 9 (Oct. 10, 1985 )).
82
See id. at 1365 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 901 , repealed b y Pub . L. No . 96-4 65, §
220 5(1), 94 S tat. 207 1, 21 59-6 0 (1980 )).
83
Id.
84
Crosby v. N at’l Fore ign T rade Council, 53 0 U .S. 36 3 (2000 ).
85
See id . at 366 -67.
86
See id . at 367 .
87
Id. at 373-7 4.
88
Perpich v. Dep ’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
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National Guard to Central America for training.89 He argued that the
Militia Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorized the calling of any kind
of state troops to active service only “for three limited purposes that do not
encompass either foreign service or nonemergency conditions.”90 But the
Court upheld the federal action; pursuant to a federal statute, all National
Guardsmen are members not only of their state forces but also of a reserve
component of the U.S. Army.91 Consequently, the Court concluded, the
federal government has authority to deploy Minnesota National Guardsmen
for training abroad.92
G. The Armed Forces
The Rehnquist Court also decided a number of important cases
challenging actions taken by the military. In these cases, the Court
generally did not interfere. Even in the few cases when the Rehnquist Court
did not completely agree with the military’s positions, however, it kept its
intrusion into military activity to a minimum.
1. Courts-Martial
Several of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions involved courts-martial.
Court-martial cases in lower tribunals often involve criminal prosecutions
concerning offenses that have little to do with national security. But the
cases that came to the Rehnquist Court involved important questions of
executive and congressional authority over military matters. In these cases,
the Rehnquist Court did not disturb the judgments of other branches of the
government. 93
89

Id. at 336-3 8.
Id. at 347 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, which states that Congress may
“pro vide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppre ss
Insurrections and repel Invasions,” and id. cl. 16, which states that Congress may
provide fo r the “organizing, arming, and disciplining” of the M ilitia).
91
Id. at 346 (explaining that “under the dual enlistment pro visions o f the statute
that have been in effect since 1933, a member o f the Guard who is ordered to active
duty in the federal service is thereby relieved of his or her status in the State Guard
for the entire period of federal service” (q uotatio n omitted)).
92
Id. at 354-5 5.
93
The Rehnqu ist Court decided severa l cases inv olving courts-martial in
addition to the ones described above. See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529,
531 (2004) (considering whether the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces lacked
jurisdiction to enjoin the removal of an airman from the service); Ryder v. United
States, 515 U.S. 17 7, 179 (1995) (deciding a proc edural issue concerning
Appointments Clause challenges to military judges); Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452 , 461 (1994) (deciding a right-to-co unsel issue).
90
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*1133 In Solorio v. United States,94 for example, a member of the Coast
Guard made a constitutional challenge to the jurisdiction of a court-martial
that tried him for sex offenses allegedly committed against the children of
another Coast Guardsman. He argued that the court-martial lacked
jurisdiction because the charged offenses lacked any “service
connection.”95 The Supreme Court disagreed.96 In an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that a court-martial’s jurisdiction
depends solely on the accused’s status as a member of the armed forces,
and not on the character of the offense.97 The Court reasoned that a
requirement that the offense have a service connection did not exist in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14.98 The decision overruled another case,
O’Callahan v. Parker,99 decided by the Warren Court seventeen years
earlier.100
In Weiss v. United States101 and Edmond v. United States,102 the
Rehnquist Court considered challenges to the appointment process for the
trial and appellate judges involved in courts-martial.103 The appointment
process in these cases did not involve the President; instead, the senior
legal officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force assigned personnel to serve
as military judges in their respective services,104 and the Secretary of
Transportation assigned military judges in the Coast Guard.105 The accused
in these cases contended that vesting the task of appointing military judges
in these officials violated the Appointments Clause. 106 The defendants
94

Solo rio v. U nited S tates, 48 3 U .S. 43 5 (1987 ).
Id. at 436.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 450-51.
98
Id. at 441-45 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, which pro vides Co ngress
with the power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces”).
99
O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 27 4 (1969 ) (holding that because the
offenses committed by a U.S. Army sergeant were not service co nnected, he could
not be charged by a co urt-martial), overruled by So lorio v. United States, 483 U.S.
435 (1987).
100
Solo rio, 48 3 U .S. at 43 6 (overruling O’Callahan).
101
W eiss v. U nited S tates, 51 0 U .S. 16 3 (1994 ).
102
Edmon d v. U nited S tates, 52 0 U .S. 65 1 (1997 ).
103
See W eiss, 51 0 U .S. at 18 1; Ed mon d, 52 0 U .S. at 66 6.
104
See W eiss, 51 0 U .S. at 16 8.
105
See E dmo nd, 520 U .S. at 65 3-54 .
106
See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 171; Edmon d, 52 0 U .S. at 65 5-56 (citing U .S. Co nst.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which states that the President “shall appoint...all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
95

16

THE REHNQUIST COURT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

argued that only the President could appoint military judges, and that the
Senate had to confirm them. 107 In Weiss, the Court held that military
officers detailed to serve as military judges did not pose a constitutional
problem; because they had already received commissions as military
officers, they did not need an additional appointment to serve as military
judges.108 In Edmond, the Court held *1134 that the Secretary of Transportation could appoint civilians to serve as appellate judges on the Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals because these appellate judges are
“inferior officers” not covered by the Appointments Clause.109
Courts-martial conduct trials according to the Rules for Courts-Martial
and the Military Rules of Evidence in the Manual for Courts-Martial, which
the President promulgates by executive order.110 In two important cases,
the Rehnquist Court considered challenges to these rules. In United States
v. Scheffer,111 the accused challenged a provision in the Military Rules of
Evidence that prohibited the introduction of polygraph evidence.112 He
argued that the prohibition violated the Fifth Amendment requirement of
due process and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by
preventing him from introducing exculpatory evidence. 113 But the Court
rejected this argument.114 It held that the President’s rule was “a rational
and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring
unreliable evidence.”115 The Court thus did not interfere with the President’s decision to promulgate the Military Rules of Evidence.

which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appo intment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts o f Law, o r in the H eads of Departments”).
107
See W eiss, 51 0 U .S. at 17 0; Ed mon d, 52 0 U .S. at 65 5-56 .
108
W eiss, 51 0 U .S. at 17 6.
109
Edmon d, 52 0 U .S. at 66 6.
110
See, e.g., Ame ndments to the Ma nual for Courts-Martial, United States,
Exec. Order N o. 13 ,387 , 70 F ed. R eg. 60 ,697 (Oct. 18, 2005 ).
111
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U .S. 30 3 (1998 ).
112
Id. at 306-07 (quoting Mil. R. Evid. 707(a), which states: “Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of
a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking
of a polygraph examina tion, shall not be adm itted into evidence”).
113
See id . at 307 -08 & 307 n.3.
114
See id . at 309 , 317 .
115
Id. at 312.
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In Loving v. United States,116 a court-martial sentenced a soldier to
death in connection with murders committed in the course of robberies.117
The soldier challenged the death sentence as unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment.118 The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the
Eighth Amendment permits the imposition of the death penalty for murder
only if the presence of predefined aggravating factors shows a greater level
of culpability.119 In Loving, a court-martial found the presence of three
aggravating factors listed in the Rules for Courts-Martial promulgated by
the President.120 The accused argued that the President lacked the authority
to promulgate*1135 the applicable rules by executive order.121 But the
Court rejected this contention, relying on statutes giving the President
authority to establish procedural rules for courts-martial and to limit the
punishments that courts-martial may impose.122
The Loving case stressed two points. One is that national security
requires military discipline, which is accomplished through courtsmartial.123 The other is that the Court must defer to the President as
Commander in Chief in his control of military forces and military policy. 124

116

Loving v. U nited S tates, 51 7 U .S. 74 8 (1996 ).
Id. at 751.
118
Id. at 754-5 5.
119
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U .S. 238 (1972 ) (per curiam), the Supreme Co urt
held that death penalty sentencing schemes were unconstitutional in a situation
where they did not limit discretion sufficiently to prevent the arbitrary or capricious
imposition of capita l punishm ent. In sub sequent cases, the C ourt ruled that death
penalty schemes may be co nstitutional if they require proof of “aggravating factors”
that justify impo sing the capital p unishm ent instead of a lesser penalty. Se e, e.g.,
Low enfield v. Phe lps, 48 4 U .S. 23 1, 24 4-45 (1988).
120
See Loving, 517 U .S. at 751 (describing how the cou rt-martial fo und, with
respect to the murders of two taxi drivers, “(1) that the premeditated murder of the
second driver was com mitted during the co urse of a rob bery, Rule for C ourtsMartial (RCM) 100 4(c)(7)(B); (2) that Loving acted as the triggerman in the felony
murder of the first driver, RCM 1004(c)(8); and (3) that Loving, having been found
guilty of the premeditated murder, had committed a second murder...,RCM
100 4(c)(7)(J)”).
121
See id . at 751 -52.
122
Id. at 769-7 0 (citing 10 U .S.C. § § 81 8, 83 6, 85 6).
123
See id. at 763-67 (describing the lessons the Framers learned from the
English Parliament’s experience in using courts-martial and the subsequent decision
to vest C ongress with the pow er to regulate the Armed Forces).
124
See id. at 768 (reasoning that “it would be contrary to the respect owed the
President as Co mmander in Chief to hold that he may not be given wide discretion
and authority”).
117
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Because of these points, the Loving case has had and will continue to have
a lasting effect on national security matters.
Federal courts have relied on Loving in several important national
security cases. One court, for example, cited the decision in litigation
regarding the conviction of Jonathan Pollard for being a spy for Israel.125
Loving’s principles also have come up in litigation concerning Zacharias
Moussaoui, who now has confessed to conspiring with the September 11th
hijackers.126 Further, Loving has played a role in the litigation concerning
Jose Padilla, an American citizen whom the President ordered the military
to hold as an enemy combatant.127
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the President ordered the
establishment of “military commissions”--a form of military tribunal--to try
enemy detainees suspected of war crimes.128 The actual trials have not yet
occurred, but cases may arise that challenge the subject matter jurisdiction
of the military commissions, their judicial composition, and the procedures
that they use. If courts reach the merits of these cases, they are likely to
look at the broad language in Solorio, Edmond, and Scheffer for guidance
on these issues, even though these precedents concern courts-martial and
not military commissions.
2. Military Counterterrorism Cases
In addition to these cases concerning courts-martial, the Rehnquist
Court decided two very significant counterterrorism cases following the
attacks*1136 of September 11, 2001. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,129 an
American citizen named Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was taken into military
custody in Afghanistan and subsequently transferred to a navy brig in South
Carolina, challenged the lawfulness of his detention by the U.S. military.130
Five Justices, in two separate opinions, concluded that a congressional
authorization to use force against the persons responsible for the September

125
See U nited S tates v. P ollard , 416 F.3d 48, 5 7 (D .C. Cir. 2005) (citing
separation o f powers principles set forth in Loving), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1590
(2006).
126
See U nited States v. M oussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 46 9 (4th Cir. 2004) (same),
cert. de nied, 5 44 U .S. 93 1 (2005 ).
127
See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 714 (2d Cir. 2003) (same), rev’d on
other grounds, 542 U .S. 42 6 (2004 ).
128
See Military Order of November 13, 2001: D etention, Treatment, and Trial
of Certain N on-Citizens in the W ar Against T errorism, 3 C .F.R. 9 18 (200 2).
129
Hamdi v. Rum sfeld, 542 U .S. 50 7 (2004 ).
130
Id. at 510-1 1.
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11, 2001 attacks empowered the President to capture and detain enemy
combatants, even if they are American citizens.131 But a majority,
composed of a different set of Justices, concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required the military to give Hamdi a hearing
at which he could contest whether he was in fact an enemy combatant (as
opposed to a noncombatant, such as a traveler, tourist, or student whom the
military had mistakenly captured).132
In this instance, by requiring the military to give Hamdi a hearing, the
Court departed from its usual practice of noninterference with the guardians
of national security. Yet, the interference was minor for three reasons. First,
a joint service regulation already required the armed forces to afford a
hearing to detainees who challenged their status.133 The decision thus did
not require the military to take any action that it had not already committed
itself to take.
Second, the hearing requirement did not pose a large burden on the
military. The plurality said that Hamdi would bear the burden of proof at
the hearing and that the government could present hearsay evidence to
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See id. at 517 (opinion o f O’Conno r, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.) (“[W]e conclude that the [Authorization for Use of M ilitary
Force] is explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals....”);
see also id. at 589 (Th oma s, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the plurality that the
Federal Government has power to detain those that the Executive Branch
determines to be enem y com batan ts.”).
132
See id . at 533 (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.) (“We therefore hold that a citizen -detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enem y com batan t must rec eive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to reb ut the G overnment’s
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”); see also id. at 553 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although I think litigation of Hamd i’s
status as an enemy combatant is unnecessary, the terms of the plurality’s remand
will allow Hamdi to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant, and he
should at the least have the benefit of that o ppo rtunity.”).
133
See id. at 550 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Ginsburg, J.) (explaining that the government’s position that it did not have to
provide detainees with a hearing was “appa rently at odds with the military
regulation, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retain ed Personnel, Civilian Internees and
Other Detainees, Army Reg. 190-8, ch. 1, §§ 1-5, 1-6 (1997)”). The m ilitary
inexplicably had not followed this regulation when taking prisoners in Afghanistan.
See id. at 55 0-51 .
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justify his detention. 134 Following these principles, the United States
subsequently held “Combatant Status Review” hearings for several hundred
prisoners captured in Afghanistan, releasing only a handful of these
prisoners.135
*1137 Third, although the Court required the military to afford
detainees a hearing, the plurality opinion in dicta expressed agreement with
the military on two important procedural principles. First, even though the
question was not before the Court, the opinion said that detention of an
enemy combatant can last for the duration of the relevant hostilities.136
Second, the Court asserted that the President can try enemy combatants by
military commissions.137 These pronouncements likely will lead to
noninterference with the government in future cases.
The Hamdi case was important in lower court litigation prior to Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s death. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,138 the D.C. Circuit
relied in part on Hamdi in rejecting a detainee’s challenge to trial by
military commission.139 Similarly, in Padilla v. Hanft,140 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the United States could detain an American citizen, captured
at O’Hare International Airport, as an enemy combatant.141 The govern-
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See id. at 533-34 (plurality opinion) (“Hearsay...may need to be accepted as
the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.
Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the
Go vernm ent’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and
fair opportunity for rebuttal were provid ed.”).
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See Dep’t of Def., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary 1,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050301csrt.pdf (last visited June 11,
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reviews held fro m August 13, 20 04 until March 1 , 200 5).
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authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict....” (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat 224, 224
(2001))).
137
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Ex p arte Q uirin, 31 7 U .S. 1, 28, 30 (1942))).
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006).
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Id. at 43.
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Pad illa v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1649
(2006).
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ment’s initial victories in these cases showed that the lower courts
interpreted Hamdi not to represent a major disruption of the government’s
handling of the national security issues raised by terrorism.
The other significant terrorism case, Rasul v. Bush,142 held that the
federal courts had jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions filed by
or on behalf of the detainees held by the military at the U.S. Naval Base in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.143 This decision was contrary to the government’s
position, and thus represents another rare example of the Rehnquist Court’s
interference with a guardian of national security. But the interference was
minor in two respects. First, the Court rested its decision solely on
statutory, not constitutional, grounds.144 Congress, as a result, could and
subsequently did pass legislation to remove federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction over detainees at Guantanamo Bay.145 Second, the Court
limited its conclusion to the question *1138 of jurisdiction; it did not
indicate whether the detainees had federal rights that the federal courts
could vindicate.146 At least one lower court subsequently held that
detainees do not have these federal rights.147 So as with the intelligence
agencies, the FBI, and the Customs Service, the Rehnquist Court largely
kept its hands off of the military in national security cases.
142

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U .S. 46 6 (2004 ).
Id. at 484.
144
See id. (“We therefore hold that [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 confers on the District
Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of
their detention a t the Guantan amo Bay Naval B ase.”).
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See D epartment of De fense, Emergency Sup plem ental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e)) (providing, subject to certain exceptions, that “no court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider--(1 ) an ap plicatio n for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
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Amendment” after its Senate sponso rs. See, e.g., Editorial, The President and the
Courts, N.Y. T im es, M ar. 20, 2 006 , at A22 (referring to the “Graham -Levin
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“non-resident aliens captured and detained pursuant to the [Authorization for Use
of Military Force] and the President’s Detention Order have no viable constitutional
basis to seek a writ of habeas corpus”). But see In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,
355 F. Sup p. 2d 443 , 463 (D.D .C. 20 05) (reaching the contra ry conclusion that
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II. Assessment
Perhaps the simplest way to assess the Rehnquist Court’s practice of not
interfering with the guardians of national security is to consider separately
its apparent benefits and its apparent costs. As the following discussion will
show, on balance, the positive consequences appear to have outweighed the
negative.
A. Benefits of the Practice of Noninterference
The Rehnquist Court’s noninterference with the government in national
security cases appears to have had two general benefits. First, it probably
enhanced national security by allowing the government officials and
institutions most competent in the subject of national security to decide
how to make the nation safer from external threats. Second, it insulated the
Supreme Court from the kinds of criticism and controversy that the Court
has experienced in comparable areas--such as public safety--where the
Court has exercised greater supervision of government actions.
1. Enhancing National Security
The United States faces many threats to its national security. It has poor
relations with nations, like Iran and North Korea, that have or may soon
have nuclear weapons.148 It has large numbers of armed forces in dangerous locations around the world, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.149 And as
recent experience has shown, it faces the possibility of horrific terrorist
attacks on its own soil.
Governmental decisions can improve or worsen national security. Put
simply, some courses of action might make the country and its citizens
safer, while others might make them less safe. Consider, for example, the
United *1139 States’ relations with North Korea. Should the United States
provide conditional aid to the North Korean government to entice it to
pursue less bellicose policies? Or should the United States withhold aid and
threaten sanctions or military action unless North Korea gives up weapons
development? The choice is not obvious (at least to a nonexpert), but it is
clearly important. A bad decision may lead to a nuclear war that a good
decision might avoid.
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See S tate Department Inform ation R elease, supra note 3 .
See A fghan B omb W ound s 5 G .I.’s, N.Y . Times, Ap r. 2, 20 06, § 1, at 8
(reporting that the United States has 18,000 troops in Afghanistan); Edward W ong,
U.S. Forces in Big Assault Near Samarra, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2006, at A12
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The Constitution and legislation divide responsibility for making
decisions about national security among different governmental units,
including Congress, the President, and various federal agencies. These
governmental units adopt and implement numerous policies designed to
make the country safer. They decide what foreign policies to pursue, how
best to protect classified information, what intelligence gathering efforts to
use, and so forth.
A basic question then arises about whether judicial oversight of these
guardians of national security would improve or impair national security--that is, whether the substantive involvement of judges would make the
country more or less safe from external threats. In most cases, it stands to
reason,150 the governmental units responsible for making national security
decisions will do a better job than the courts could expect to do. In general,
agencies that specialize in protecting national security, such as the CIA and
DOD, will have greater expertise in the area than the Supreme Court. These
agencies also will have more information. And they will have a greater
incentive not to make mistakes because, lacking life tenure, the leaders of
these agencies can be held accountable for their decisions.
In this way, by generally not interfering with the guardians of national
security, the Rehnquist Court probably contributed to the safety of the
nation. The extent of the benefit is undoubtedly impossible to measure. But
it is difficult to think of a possible reason that the nation might be less
secure because of the Court’s practice of noninterference. Whether
improving national security has come with other costs--such as enabling
governmental abuses of individual rights--is a separate question considered
below.
2. Preserving the Reputation of the Supreme Court
National security policy is a very controversial subject. Many people
agree with decisions that the United States has made in the area, while
others believe that the government has made serious wrong turns. But one
thing remarkably absent from public debate is placement of significant
blame on the Rehnquist Court for perceived shortcomings in national
security policy.
The reason that the Rehnquist Court avoided criticism of this kind
should be no mystery: as Part I of this Essay showed, the Rehnquist Court
almost always deferred to the political branches on matters of national
150
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security. As a result, the political branches have received all of the credit
for the successes of their programs and policies, and all of the blame for
their shortcomings. The Rehnquist Court did not have any substantive
national security policies of its own, and therefore it attracted no substantive criticism.
*1140 By way of comparison, consider public safety issues such as
police investigative practices, criminal procedures, prisoners’ rights, death
penalty restrictions, and so forth. Just as with national security, many
disagreements have arisen about the wisdom of the current substantive
approaches to these subjects. But the criticism does not fall exclusively on
the political branches. On the contrary, in the area of public safety, a great
deal of criticism falls on the Supreme Court.151
Again, the reason is evident: the Supreme Court has faced more
criticism with respect to public safety issues because of its extensive
substantive participation in the area. The Warren Court famously began
reworking criminal laws and procedures from start to finish. Although the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts differed considerably from the Warren Court,
they continued to interfere with governmental law enforcement policies. As
a result, the Supreme Court could never avoid controversy and blame.
The Rehnquist Court, in all likelihood, would have found itself
embroiled in similar controversy if it had not taken its hands-off approach
to national security. By deferring to the guardians of national security, the
Court avoided this potential storm. Thus, the Court’s practice of noninterference in matters of national security both improved the safety of the
nation and benefited the Court as an institution.
B. Costs of the Practice of Noninterference
A question separate from the benefits of the Rehnquist Court’s
noninterference with the guardians of national security is whether the
Court’s approach came at a price. As a theoretical matter, the executive and
legislative branches, if unchecked by the judicial branch, could abuse
individual rights or commit other misdeeds in the name of national security.
But this possible negative consequence does not appear to have occurred
to any significant extent during the nineteen-year period of the Rehnquist
Court.
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See, e.g., Harold J. Rothwax, Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice (1996)
(setting forth a now classic condemnation of judicially led developments in the
criminal justice system).
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1. Abdication of the Court’s Duty to Protect Individual Rights
We know from history that promoting national security may come at the
expense of individual rights. In his book, All the Laws but One, Chief
Justice Rehnquist describes government excesses during the Civil War,
World War I, and World War II.152 During these prior conflicts, the federal
government locked up thousands of citizens, sometimes without criminal
charges, a trial, or even a characterization as the enemy. 153
This unfortunate history, however, cannot justify condemnation of the
Rehnquist Court’s practice of noninterference in national security cases for
two reasons. First, an era of the Supreme Court should be judged by the
decisions that the Court actually made during the era, not by decisions that
it might have made. In this regard, the Rehnquist Court existed at a
fortunate *1141 time in our history. From 1986 to 2005, the Supreme
Court’s docket did not include cases involving extreme national security
policies of the kind Chief Justice Rehnquist described in his book. Because
the Rehnquist Court was not asked to review governmental policies of this
kind, its practice of noninterference did not have major negative impacts on
individual rights. In other words, even if a possible consequence of a policy
of noninterference might be an abdication of the Court’s duty to protect
individual rights, this possible consequence did not occur.154
Second, predictions about what the Rehnquist Court might have done
if extreme cases had come before it cannot rest solely on what the Court did
in the more moderate cases that it actually considered. Even if the
Rehnquist Court had taken a more active role in supervising the government in the national security cases described above, we cannot know for
certain what the Rehnquist Court would have done if a national crisis had
prompted the government to act as it did during past wars. Indeed, in his
book, Chief Justice Rehnquist hypothesized that political leaders and courts
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See id .
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Looking just at the Suprem e Court’s docket do es not pro vide a com plete
picture of what is happ ening in the country. A p olicy of noninterference by the
Supreme Court theoretically might encourage misbehavior that does not reach the
courts. For example, once the CIA know s that the co urts will not overturn its
personnel actions, it may treat its officials and emp loyees less fairly. But evidence
is lacking for the proposition that more misbeh avior actually occurred during the
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realistically cannot be expected to stand in the way of actions legitimately
taken to protect national security in times of emergency.155
2. Enabling Post Hoc Rationalizations
Another potential problem with deferring in all cases involving national
security is that it creates a great temptation for the government to use
national security as a justification for all of its actions. If the government
knows that the Court defers when it cites national security, the government
may be tempted to cite national security in cases that do not actually
concern it. Just as patriotism is the last refuge of every scoundrel, national
security is an argument that the government will pull out in litigation when
all else has failed.
In his book, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed hope that courts can at
least distinguish actual cases of national security from others.156 Fortunately, the Rehnquist Court was usually able to distinguish real national
security matters from those somewhat further afield. Two cases illustrate
this point. In Clinton v. Jones, 157 the President argued that the federal
courts should not hear a sexual harassment claim against him based in part
on national security *1142 concerns.158 In Boos v. Barry,159 the mayor of
Washington, D.C., sought to justify a ban on protests in front of foreign
embassies in Washington on grounds of national security.160 In both cases,
the Rehnquist Court saw through the government’s national security
arguments, perceiving possible inconvenience to the country but no actual
danger.
But at least one questionable national security argument may have
slipped through. In upholding race-based affirmative action in admissions
at the University of Michigan Law School, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger
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See R ehnq uist, supra note 8, at 224 (“There is no reason to think that future
wartime presidents will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, or that
future Justices of the Supreme Court will decide q uestions differently from their
pred ecessors.”).
156
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cited national security as one ground for its decision.162 Reliance on
national security to justify preferences at an elite law school seems a little
far-fetched. But probably the Court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had omitted all assertions about national security; the Court
cited national security as merely one of a number of other reasons for
believing that the government could have an interest in promoting racial
diversity in university admissions.163 Therefore, even if the Court erred in
this respect, the error had no consequences.
161

III. Concluding Thoughts on the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court
The Symposium in which this Essay appears concerns the legacy of the
Rehnquist Court. A legacy is something transmitted by a predecessor.164 So
what did the Rehnquist Court bequeath to the Roberts Court? The
Rehnquist Court did not create general doctrines of deference that the
Roberts Court must follow. On the contrary, as the description of the cases
above shows, the Rehnquist Court simply found one way or another to
avoid interfering with the guardians of national security in the various cases
it faced.
But this Essay suggests that the Rehnquist Court did give the Roberts
Court something important. It passed on evidence, in the form of experience, that noninterference in national security matters can serve the Court
well as an institutional matter. So long as the government does not act
abusively, allowing the political branches to decide how to respond to
national security threats provides better protection for the nation and avoids
embroiling the Court in controversy.
What the Rehnquist Court could not ensure is that the Roberts Court
will share its good fortune of not facing extreme excesses by the government. The Roberts Court may or may not be so lucky. Perhaps greater
emergencies will face the United States and the government will take far
more controversial measures in response. Just as we do not know what the
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Rehnquist *1143 Court might have done in such circumstances, only time
will tell with the Roberts Court.165

165

In the first significa nt national security case to com e befo re it, the Robe rts
Court did not follow the Rehnquist Court’s general practice of noninterference. It
enjoined the military’s use of certain tribunals (called “military commissions”) to
try suspected terrorists as unauthorized by statute or the laws of war. See Hamdan
v. Rum sfeld, 126 S . Ct. 27 49 (200 6).

